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Collective Bargaining 
and the Theory of Conflict 
Jack Barbash 
The purpose of this paper is to examine conflict in the 
bargaining context as it opérâtes mainly in the United States, and 
then draw some broad inferences for the theory of conflict. 
The nature of conflict in the industrial society is probably best 
understood in particular contexts. The aim hère is to examine conflict in the 
bargaining context as it opérâtes mainly in the United States, and then to 
draw some broad inferences for the theory of conflict. 
Bargaining functions at four basic levels: (1) at the level of the agree-
ment, which is likely to cover either a multiemployer, multiplant or single 
employer unit; (2) at the level of the shop floor, both formai and informai; 
(3) at the level of the final labor transaction between the individual 
employée and whoever monitors his work in management; and (4) in some 
sensés bargaining also functions at the level of the economy. 
Collective bargaining in the United States is a process in which unions, 
as designated représentatives of employées in specified units, negotiate 
terms of employment with appropriate employers. The parties are also like-
ly to engage in political activities to support their bargaining positions. 
Unit describes the spécifie territory — occupation, craft, department, 
multiplant, multiemployer, etc. — to which an agreement applies. The 
terms of employment regulated by collective bargaining are, fundamentally: 
(1) the price of labor, e.g., wages, suppléments and their methods of déter-
mination; (2) the utilization of labor, i.e., classification, tenure, effort and 
hours; (3) individual employée job rights, e.g., seniority, discharge for 
cause; (4) institutional rights of union and management in the relationship; 
and (5) enforcement and administration of the agreement. In the final 
analysis, the terms of collective bargaining boil down to price and power. 
* BARBASH, Jack, Professor of Economies and Industrial Relations, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
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Collective bargaining is coordinated with two complementary 
stratégies. In internai bargaining the sides bargain out their eventual posi-
tion mthin their respective organizations. In political bargaining the parties 
negotiate (in effect) with legislators and public administrators in pursuit of 
their divergent or, on occasion, joint interests. The emphasis hère is on col-
lective bargaining and internai bargaining. 
The parties ' demands on each other are made crédible by sanctions 
which promise benefit, threaten loss, persuade by rational argument and 
direct action. The strike is the key union sanction. On occasion the strike is 
backed by consumer boycotts and direct action. Withholding the demand 
for employment and containing union power are the major employer sanc-
tions. 
Sanctions need not always disadvantage the other side. Standardization 
of labor costs, improvement of product market positions and common in-
terest in shopfloor stability are, so to speak, "positive" sanctions by which 
unions will induce employers to agrée. 
The parties face each other at a negotiating table. Negotiation, normal-
ly face-to-face or through a mediator, allows each party to modify its initial 
positions as a resuit of the continuous exchange of information and feed-
back. Negotiation is part of bargaining, but not ail bargaining involves 
negotiation. That is to say, the parties can communicate terms and sanc-
tions without necessarily facing each other but without, of course, the op-
portunities for the instant feedback which face-to-face dealing makes possi-
ble. 
The bargaining process is of such scale and complexity that both sides 
require organizations to render their représentation effective. Organization, 
in turn, brings professionalization, hierarchy and, of course, internai divi-
sion which requires internai bargaining to résolve. 
In the enterprise management initiâtes and the union reacts. In collec-
tive bargaining, by contrast, the rôles are reversed: the union initiâtes and 
management reacts. Hence, the dynamics of collective bargaining usually 
represents a séquence of union demands and management reactions. 
The strike, or move to the point the threat of it, occupies the pivotai 
place in the bargaining paradigm. The labor transaction, like other transac-
tions, requires withholding capabilities on the part of buyer and seller to 
make their bargaining demands crédible. Absent a withholding capability 
institutionalized in the strike neither side can really bargain with the other. 
The employer will not ordinarily corne voluntarily to a bargaining table 
which will resuit in the impairment of "management rights". Only a threat 
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of impending loss will bring him there. Analogously, the likely costs of 
striking to the employées and the union keep union demands within bounds. 
Unions utilize three classes of sanctions for bargaining leverage: (1) 
withholding labor institutionalized in the strike, (2) withholding pro-
duct/service demand institutionalized in the boycott, and (3) direct action 
against the physical instruments of production and/or the people who man 
them. 
A "primary" strike in American usage withholds labor from an 
employer who is a direct party to the dispute. A secondary strike withholds 
labor from an employer who is not a direct party to the dispute but who, in 
varying degrees, is important to the employer directly involved in the 
dispute. 
Unions at the shop floor initiate more limited withholding of labor: the 
wildcat, the slowdown, refusai to work overtime, mass résignations, etc. 
The wildcat is a cessation of work, not approved by the higher level union 
authority, and is commonly initiated by a smaller group within the bargain-
ing unit. In the slowdown the workers stay on the job but work at a reduced 
pace. Wildcats and slowdowns are likely not to last as long as the conven-
tional strike and are commonly called to protest spécifie actions by manage-
ment, antagonistic work groups, or union leadership. 
Managements bargaining strategy also includes internai bargaining 
prior to and concurrent with collective bargaining. Internai bargaining 
arises out of the complexity and scale of the management organization. Top 
management will shade the management interest somewhat differently from 
the industrial relations department or the foremen who hâve to live daily 
with the union. From another standpoint, finance, production and public 
relations are also likely to bring somewhat varying mixes of management 
préférences. 
Management^ first reaction to a union is to avoid it if it can. Failing 
this it tries to trim the union's effect on management costs and power. 
If bargaining cornes the sanctions available to management are based 
on its ability to withhold demand for union labor. In the event of a strike, 
management may choose to "take a long strike" to wear the union down. 
In the process it may try to eut its losses by prestrike stockpiling, farming 
out of struck work and strike insurance. Commonly, management intends 
reconcilitation with the union after a strike. 
There has been something of a récent tendency in several industries, 
strike or no strike, for management to go nonunion; that is, to sever the 
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union relationship altogether. Management may go nonunion at the same 
location or relocate to a more congenial région. 
Management may pursue a "union substitution" policy which has it 
doing for the employées many of the same things which a union does but 
short of an active union présence. In this tactic management in effect "buys 
out" the employées' union impulse. 
If management cornes to terms with the union, it may thereafter seek to 
eut the losses of its earlier concessions. It may utilize labor more 
economically, or exclude certain terms of employment from bargaining — 
this was the objective of Scientific Management. 
Managements may elect to eut losses in a more positive way by "pro-
blem solving", sometimes also called coopérative, collaborative or in-
tegrative bargaining. The assumption is that there are labor problems which 
can be resolved with advantage, or the lowest disadvantage, to bot h sides 
through rational examination rather than by each side disadvantaging the 
other. This is problem solving because the primary objective is not to 
enhance or diminish the position of one side against the other but to deal 
with a difficult situation. The grievance procédure is probably the most pro-
minent example of problem solving in collective bargaining. But acceptance 
of the grievance procédure framework does not preclude the parties from 
using it to enhance their relative advantage. 
Like unions, managements utilize public policy bargaining to reenforce 
their price and power objectives in bargaining by opposing or supporting 
législation. Electoral support, lobbying and political contributions are the 
means. Historically, business resorted to the courts to avoid collective 
bargaining. After the Wagner Act, employers' main public policy objective 
was to seek redress of the balance of power in their favor through statutory 
change and the appointment of sympathetic regulators. There are also 
"problem solving" analogs in political bargaining. 
The "building block" of the work society is the primary work group. 
The work groups in the work society "consciously or unconsciously ... 
build up a self-defence organization to resist the changes that management 
is imposing" (Whyte, 218) or "to prevent the individual from appropriating 
more than his rightful share of work". (Perlman, 242) 
The work groups which comprise the work society may be concep-
tualized as informai bargainers with spécifie objectives and with sanctions 
at their disposai to pursue and enforce their objectives. The work group as a 
bargainer antedates the union but coexists_with the union. Where the work 
group coexists with a union, "at worst Ijtl play£s_/ an autonomous rôle, 
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showing slight respect for the union or its policies". At best it meets *'needs 
that the union disdains to consider, needs too petty and troublesome to be 
dealt with as union matters". (Kuhn, 131-32) The bargaining relationship is 
with the employer and inside the work society between work groups. 
The core interest of the work group is the continuous bargaining of ef-
fort value — the relationship between effort and wages — to utilize 
Baldamus' formulation: "Wages are costs to the firm, and the deprivations 
inhérent in effort mean 'costs' to the employée ... A relative lowering of ef-
fort value is an advantage to management and a disadvantage to the 
workers, for it implies, by définition, that effort intensity per unit of wages 
is increased ,\ (Baldamus, 105) 
Bargaining of effort value is necessarily continuous. Since "the formai 
wage contract is never précise in stipulating how much effort is expected for 
a given wage (and vice versa), /the/ détails of the arrangement are left to be 
worked out through the direct interaction between the partners of the con-
tract". (Baldamus, 35) In this respect supervision is managements shop-
level bargaining. "If a worker slackens his effort at one moment, the 
foreman's job is to remind him, as it were, that he départs from his obliga-
tions, and, in certain circumstances, it is quite possible that there may be 
some haggling between the two as to what is a 'fair' degree of effort in rela-
tion to the wages paid". (Baldamus, 36) 
The effort bargain can be perceived as a function of the condition of 
the external labor and product market. 
If ... the local supply of labor for a particular job (or industry) becomes 
scarce, the workers' expectation of tolerable effort will move towards 
looser rates ... If, on the other hand, the supply of labor is abundant, ex-
pectations will gradually be adjusted in the opposite direction toward 
tighter rates. Similar effects may corne from the product market. When 
the market expands and the firm's demand for labor expands, manage-
ment may be compelled to attract labor by what amounts to relatively 
loose rates. And increasing compétition in the product market means that 
existing effort values hâve to be tightened up. (Baldamus, 104) 
The work society seeks to préserve a maximum degree of predictability, 
stability and surveillance oj^the conditions of employment. More specifical-
ly, the work society "set/s./ and maintain/^/ a level of output or earnings 
which corresponds to the value the members place upon their efforts within 
existing conditions of work and pay". (Kuhn, 132) The work society has 
"remarkably précise and rational conceptions in respect of effort values". 
(Baldamus, 94) 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE THEORY OF CONFLICT 651 
A second work society objective is to conserve the supply of work and 
employment. The worker "knows the conditions of the markets in which he 
sells and delivers his labor, and his policies are dictated by the practical 
necessity of avoiding o ver production". (Leiserson, 165) The worker's 
outlook is on the pessimistic side and he is likely to err on the side of work 
scarcity. 
A third objective is to maintain "the integrity and prestige" of the 
respective work groups compared to other groups. (Kuhn, 134) Each work 
group "may seek to enlarge the area of work in its own job classification, to 
raise its members, earnings or lessen its members' work effort, to restrict 
bumping in from other groups, and to gain any spécial privilège it can". 
(Kuhn, 134) 
The sanctions which the work groups hâve at their disposai corne from 
the withholding of effort which, in turn, dérives from work group 
cohesiveness. The methods of withholding effort by work groups are of two 
types. In the first type the withholding rations effort and output — the 
classic term is "restriction of output" as in the setting of précise work 
quotas, bans on overtime or in "banking" previous quota surpluses. 
The second type of withholding is not so much explicit rationing as it is 
a protest — i.e., the slowdown against too low wages or too high 
workloads. "Convinced that the pièce rate is too low, the workers stand 
together to hold down production to hurt management and thus force an in-
crease in the price". (Whyte, 26) 
Withholding by restriction, whether as protest or rationing, "is a 
widespread institution, deeply intrenched in the working habits of 
American laboring people". (Leiserson, 146) "Restriction of output in 
some form exists in practically every plant, on ail sorts of jobs, and under 
ail kinds of payment Systems. It is so common as to be taken for granted." 
(Gardner, 150) 
The work group applies sanctions to secure compliance from its dé-
viant members. Ostracism, oral disapproval and even physical force or the 
threat of it, may be resorted to. The work group relationship thus implies 
"control and conformity" for the members. (Tannenbaum, 61) 
Individual workers may, apart from concerted action, practice their 
own withholding to express discontent. Tardiness, absenteeism, quits and 
acts of indiscipline on the job, like insubordination, pilferage and low work 
quality, are the channels through which this form of protest travels. 
The agreement sets the broad rules for determining the price of labor 
and related conditions of sale. (Flanders, 1-26) Only in subséquent shop 
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transactions are the rules translated into spécifie priées for spécifie workers, 
where eventually the individual work bargains will be consummated. The 
grievance-arbitration System is the mechanism through which shop-floor 
disputes over individual or group priées are resolved. Or to put it another 
way, grievance-arbitration carries the pricemaking process one step beyond 
the broad framework established in the agreement. 
But even so the grievance-arbitration System yields a resuit which falls 
materially short of completing the labor bargain for every employée; even-
tually this is completed only in the continuous bargaining relationship bet-
ween the employée and his immédiate superior. 
The negotiation of the agreement, even with grievance-arbitration, 
does not work out to a. joint decisionmaking process between equals in any 
operational sensé; which, in any case, neither of the parties really wants. 
Management still "retains the right to act" on its own in the first instance. 
(Feller, 737) Ail the grievance procédure does is to make management 
authority "conditional" (Kuhn-2, 263) and then applicable only to a small 
minority of ail disputes. 
In gênerai, the union rejects true joint decisionmaking, that is where 
the parties make décisions together as equals. Instead, the union prefers to 
leave the initiatives in the enterprise to management. In this way its rôle as 
counsel for the défense is not compromised in a grievance which might 
subsequently arise over an earlier joint décision. Exceptions are industries 
such as apparel in which the union is the dominant partner and individual 
managements are incapable of seeing through major industrywide in-
itiatives on their own. 
Conflict, latent or manifest, is the essence of industrial relations, but 
the object of industrial relations as technique is the resolution of the con-
flict. Conflict is the essence of industrial relations because industrialism 
necessarily générâtes stratifications which, in turn, necessarily generate ten-
sions among those stratified. 
Tensions are innate to the industrial order, regardless of whether it is a 
socialist or capitalist order. To put it summarily, tensions spring from 
technology, scale, organization, efficiency and uncertainty — the essential 
features of industrialism. Thèse features necessarily generate tensions 
(again in shorthand terms) of command and subordination, competiveness, 
exploitation, physical deprivation at work and économie insecurity. In-
dustrial relations as technique consists largely of resolving tensions in the in-
terest of preserving a going enterprise. 
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Tensions are latent conflict which become overt in diverse manifesta-
tions. The strike is only one manifestation, albeit the most costly. 
The conflict "universe" consists of a variety of adversary interaction. 
The adversaries are, as we hâve seen, either unions vs. employers or 
employées vs. employées and management vs. management. More recently 
the state has become a bargaining adversary seeking to influence the out-
come of the labor transaction between unions and employers. 
The locus of conflict in which the adversaries operate is either the 
bargaining table for the negotiation of the agreement or the shop floor for 
the further negotiation or application of the agreement. The third locus of 
conflict is politics, where unions and employers pursue their adversary in-
terests — and occasionally common interests — in the forum provided by 
the public policy debate. 
Each locus of conflict has its characteristic instrumentality. Collective 
bargaining typically produces the strike. The grievance and wildcat strikes 
spring from the union-management relationship on the shop floor; and 
absenteeism, quits and indiscipline are manifestations of conflict in the in-
formai work society. Political conflict générâtes élection contests and 
législative votes. 
Conflict in industrial relations, or mostly the threat of it — far from 
being pathological or aberrant — is normal and even necessary. The princi-
pe is that the parties can be kept "honest" only by countervailing checks 
and balances. Conflict looking toward resolution is like a stabilizer or 
governor which signais the parties away from extrême positions by confron-
ting them with the likely costs. 
Latent and manifest conflicts contain within them — to put it into the 
dialectical style — the seeds of their own resolution. Indeed, industrial con-
flict cannot be understood at ail without a frame of référence that also in-
cluded conflict resolution. This is because in the bargaining context conflict 
is not an end itself but a means to an end; specifically, a means to induce 
agreement. 
Bargaining is, as has been said by many, a coopérative form of conflict 
in which the parties — or for that matter the social partners (as they are call-
ed in Western Europe) — seek to exchange what they want from each other. 
Unlike competitors who seek to oust one another, bargainers seek a mutual-
ly agreeable exchange. Unions and managements compete only for the in-
tangible value of employée loyalty. In fact, the parties to the labor transac-
tion are tied to each other more than nonlabor buyers and sellers because 
alternate sources of labor supply and demand are much more difficult to 
corne by. 
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In the perceptions of the parties collective bargaining is mostly an 
adversary game constrained at the margin only by the common interest in 
the size of the fund available for distribution to wages and profits. Yet the 
fundamental commonality which underlies the collective bargaining rela-
tionship is underscored by the préoccupation of the parties with the 
avoidance and rationalization of overt conflict. 
Rationalization of conflict means that the parties hâve substituted pro-
cédural and substantive rules for trial-by-ordeal and confrontation. The 
strike has gradually been divested of its confrontational aspect and, for 
many purposes, has been reduced to a séquence of symbolic gestures. 
Nonetheless, confrontation is never far from the surface. Rationalization 
does not imply that the différences which divide the parties are any less but 
that the différences are no longer asserted through physical encounters. 
The concept of a generalized, overriding class struggle culminating in 
the triumph of the working class cannot find support in the évidence of col-
lective bargaining. The first problem with the concept has to do with the 
fragmentation of diverse adversarial relationships which are as likely to en-
compass employées vs. employées or the states vs. unions and employers, as 
they are the classic unions vs. employers. Operationally there is no over-
riding class struggle. 
The second problem has to do with the pressures on unions and 
employers to conciliate their conflicts, making it difficult to sustain a 
posture of permanent warfare. The final problem is that both unions and 
employers hâve been able to advance their respective interests under the 
régime of bargaining, thereby avoiding the catastrophies of immiseration 
and diminishing profits which Marx had designed to bring about 
capitalism's downfall. Indeed, a sort of neo-Marxism has emerged in the 
current period which dénigrâtes the revolutionary potential of advanced 
capitalism's working class precisely because bargaining has not led to 
révolution. 
The intellectual problem is how to deal with conflict as an analytical 
category. Essentially the problem cornes to this: how can "normal" conflict 
be distinguished from "pathological" conflict. Normal conflict is the con-
flict essential to the maintenance of the System and without which the 
System is largely incapable of functioning. Pathological (or dysfunctional) 
conflict is not only not essential to the maintenance of the System, it may 
even be destructive of it. 
Although conflict is an élément in the maintenance of equilibrium in 
the industrial relations System, there is a point beyond which conflict 
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becomes "aberrant", "abnormal", "dysfunctional", or "pathological", 
or whatever the right word is. It is not yet possible to détermine analytically 
the nature of the boundary, the point at which conflict is normal or abnor-
mal at an abstract level of theory. 
But a rudimentary beginning may be made in the direction of a gênerai 
theory by examining particular cases. My method hère has been to make a 
quick mental inventory of what hâve been, by common consent, some of 
the industrial "horrible examples,, of conflict in récent times and to work 
up stepwise to a more gênerai formulation of aberrant conflict. Since this is 
very much a trial exercise, I see no point in identifying the spécifie situations 
by name. If I am right, informed observers will be able to fill in their own 
particulars without difficulty. 
I offer the following as examples of * 'déviant' ' conflict behavior: 
1. Conflict accompanied by pervasive violence. 
2. Conflict which results in wholesale disorganization of a community 
or society. 
3. Conflict which is associated with extinction of unions or 
managements as institutions. 
4. The persistence of unhealthy and unsafe work environments. 
5. The persistence of a large hard-core of absenteeism, tardiness, in-
discipline through periods of économie expansion and contraction. 
6. Long-ter m declining productivity not caused by corresponding im-
provement in work quality. 
7. The inability of workers to maintain internai unity because of 
fragmentation, as indicated by persistent wildeat strikes and acute internai 
rivalries. 
8. The permanent cooptation or manipulation of one side by the other. 
9. The exclusion of important segments of the work force from 
représentation and participation in the union or the work society. 
10. The blocking of access to fair and efficient représentation by 
bureaucracy including excessive professionalism. 
11. Persistent civil disobedience in an essentialy démocratie political 
System. 
In more gênerai terms, conflict pathology is conflict in contexts of 
violence, class warfare, social disorganization, alienating and life-
threatening work environments, low productivity, cooptation, manipula-
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tion and fragmentation, and gross inequalities in income and power, ail of 
which hâve to be présent in some egregious way to quality as pathology. 
The essential common ground occupied by ail of thèse manifestations 
of conflict pathology are: (1) the substantial impairment of the parties' 
representational capabilities, (2) major impairment of the public interest in 
the process of asserting sectional claims, and (3) infringement of basic 
human rights to be free from violence to the person and life-threatening 
stress at work. 
In sum the logic of our argument runs as follows: 
1. The wage relationship under collective bargaining is a species of ex-
change in which human effort is exchanged for a wage. 
2. The labor transaction under collective bargaining involves both con-
gruence and incongruence; congruence because one wants something from 
the other; incongruence because the sides invariably differ on the relative 
values which should prevail. 
3. In order to generalize validly as to whether the exchange relation-
ship in the case of the labor transaction is generating undue conflict the 
following conditions hâve to be met: 
a. A theory of the universe of conflict which takes into account not 
only strikes but turnover, absenteeism, sabotage, indiscipline or 
latent tendencies with thèse results. 
b. A theory of latent and overt conflict. 
c. A theory of conflict pathology; that is, when does conflict 
become dysfunctional? 
This grouping toward a theory of conflict and its pathology is not in-
tended to infer blâme or merit for one side or another. Only rarely are there 
heroes and villains in industrial relations. 
Nor are we necessarily making a judgment as to whether normality or 
pathology represent inferior or superior, lower or higher stages. They may 
very well be one or the other but this dépends on how the ' 'higher" purpose 
is defined. However, if the object is a going industrial relations System, then 
tension and conflict must be assumed as given and some understanding and 
managing of that tension and conflict constitute the essential industrial rela-
tions technique, or may be art is the better word. Pathological conflict can 
destroy or endanger the System. 
The practical questions which this line of argument is meant to address 
are two: (1) the tendency of bargaining antagonists committed to the ex-
isting industrial relations order who nevertheless press their conflict to the 
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point of dysfunction; (2) the tendency to impute dysfunction to conflict 
which is, in fact, functional. The latter is a misconception of both the right 
and the left. On the right the tendency is to mistake the absence of overt 
conflict as an indicator of management effectiveness or to overlook the 
significance of certain forms of shop-floor behavior (quits, for example) as 
conflict. On the left the tendency is to see any escalation of industrial con-
flict as the herald of the "final conflict". 
Beyond conflict is the utopian vision of relationships at work governed 
by altruism and trust: that is, by nonexchange considérations. One suspects 
that some measure of power parity is a first condition for this version of 
utopia. The négative imprint which Marx and Engels hâve put on the uto-
pian mode of spéculation ought not to deter additional reflection. 
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La négociation collective et la théorie du conflit 
Le conflit, dans le domaine des relations du travail, est en soi loin d'être aber-
rant et pathologique à moins qu'il ne s'éloigne de certaines normes. Le conflit, mani-
feste ou latent, contient la semence de sa propre solution. On ne peut d'ailleurs le 
concevoir sans l'existence d'un cadre de référence qui inclut sa solution car, dans le 
contexte de négociation, le conflit n'est pas une fin en lui-même, mais un moyen d'en 
arriver à une entente. 
La négociation est une forme coopérative de conflit dans laquelle les parties 
cherchent à échanger ce qu'elles veulent l'une de l'autre. Contrairement aux concur-
rents qui visent à l'évincer, les parties à la négociation collective veulent en arriver à 
un échange mutuel. Le concept de lutte de classe, qui culmine dans le triomphe de la 
classe ouvrière, n'a pas place dans la négociation collective, même lorsque celle-ci at-
teint le stade de la grève. 
Toutefois, bien que le conflit soit un élément du maintien du système de rela-
tions du travail, il y a un point au-delà duquel il devient «anormal», «aberrant» et 
«pathologique», mais il n'est pas facile de déterminer où cela commence. Il faut se 
contenter d'indices. D'une façon générale, les conflits deviennent «pathologiques» 
lorsqu'ils se produisent dans un climat de violence, de lutte de classe, de désorganisa-
tion sociale, de faible productivité et de grands écarts dans les revenus et les pou-
voirs. 
Toute la logique d'un exposé sur le sujet tient dans les considérations suivantes. 
D'une part, sous le régime de la négociation collective, en matière de rémunéra-
tion, les rapports entre les parties consistent dans une espèce de troc où l'on échange 
l'effort humain contre un salaire. Cette transaction est à la fois adéquate et inadé-
quate. Elle est adéquate en ce que l'une des parties veut obtenir quelque chose de 
l'autre; elle est inadéquate en ce que les parties diffèrent invariablement d'avis à pro-
pos des valeurs relatives qui devraient prévaloir. D'autre part, pour savoir si ce rap-
port d'échanges mutuels engendre un conflit indu, c'est-à-dire qui va à rencontre des 
règles, il faut que l'on retrouve les trois conditions suivantes: 
1. une théorie de l'universalité du conflit dans laquelle on tienne compte, non 
seulement de la grève, mais du roulement de la main-d'oeuvre, de l'absentéisme, du 
sabotage, de l'indiscipline, d'une faible productivité ou de tendances en ce sens; 
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2. l'existence d'une théorie de conflit ouvert ou latent; 
3. l'existence d'une théorie d'un conflit pathologique, c'est-à-dire le point où le 
conflit devient dysfonctionnel. 
Le tâtonnement dans la recherche d'une théorie du conflit et de son état patho-
logique n'est pas destiné à jeter blâme ou mérite sur l'une ou sur l'autre des parties. Il 
y a rarement des héros ou des gredins dans les relations du travail. 
Les questions pratiques que se dégagent de l'exposé précédent sont au nombre 
de deux: 1) la tendance des antagonistes engagés dans le régime actuel de relations du 
travail à pousser le conflit à un point où il deviendrait pathologique; 2) la tendance 
aussi à juger dysfonctionnel un conflit qui est en réalité normal. Dans ce dernier cas, 
il s'agit d'une fausse conception selon que l'on se réclame de la droite ou de la gau-
che. Du côté de la droite, on a tendance à considérer l'absence de conflit ouvert com-
me une indication de l'efficacité de la direction ou encore de négliger la signification 
de certaines formes de comportement dans le milieu du travail. Du côté de la gauche, 
la tendance est de voir toute escalade dans un conflit industriel comme le signe avant-
coureur du «conflit final». 
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